

# a POST Portrait John Foster

By JOSEPH P. LASH

Article VI

The dearest wish of John Foster Dulles, once he had achieved the Secretaryship, was to go down in history with a special policy named after him—like the Truman Doctrine or the Marshall Plan.

This partly explains the melodrama with which he has clothed many of his policy pronouncements—"liberation," "massive retaliation," "united action," "going to the brink" and the like.

Sometimes, as was the case with the 1954 Caracas Resolution against Communist subversion in the Americas, he has sought to give history a little jog.

The ink scarcely dry, he himself proclaimed that his resolution might "serve the needs of our time as effectively as the Monroe Doctrine served the needs of our nation during the last century."

Understandably, Dulles did not recall the Caracas Resolution after Vice President Nixon's first-hand test of its efficacy this spring.

Dulles has disclosed that when General Eisenhower first offered him the post of Secretary of State he hesitated because he'd wanted to concentrate on the formulation of long-range policy.

The need for long range planning rather than day-to-day improvisation in response to Kremlin initiatives had been a standard item in Dulles' pre-election bill of particulars against the Democrats.

He now wondered whether he could do the thinking for the new administration and also do justice to the 15 other "important duties" of the Secretary which he had enumerated for himself on a sheet of yellow scratch paper.

It did not take too long for him to conclude that policy formulation could not be the conduct of foreign affairs. Few Secretarys have the reins as tightly into their own hands as he subsequently did.

## End of the Planners

Despite his declared views on planning, Dulles proceeded to eliminate the planning group he had inherited from Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze—and to appoint a Committee to Fall into Disrepute.

He quickly gave his new committee the job of ever thinking what could be done only by the State Department.

This was a job he had, under Acheson, given to a brilliant group of young men after leaving the State Department.

In at least one instance, the group had had a "Marshall Plan" for Korea.

Although the group did not know how to do it, it immediately turned to Robert Rowley, a successor, but first-class, on assurances that the rowley really have a policy dropped the matter.

An added difficulty in Dulles' close identification with Acheson's intention to pressure from the Republic Congress against the "Acheson hangover" at this time was acquiescing to a great Congress' intervention in departmental affairs by a member of Eisenhower's Cabinet.

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